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Abstract 
Background: The irrefutable consequence of Scottish excessive alcohol consumption 
has prompted implementation and proposal of alcohol policy measures. 
Aim: To explore with heavy drinkers their awareness of and identify potential 
implications of policy introducing alcohol minimum unit pricing (MUP). 
Method: Face-to-face semi-structured interviews with drinkers with alcohol-related 
harm (n=20; 15 males, five female; aged 34 to 67 years old) in Scotland’s two largest 
cities (drinkers were participants within a larger quantitative study, through attendance 
for treatment for alcohol-related harms at NHS centres). Median weekly consumption 
amongst participants was 130.7 units (range: 28 – 256.3 UK units).  
Results: Views regarding the impact of increased alcohol prices, through MUP, were 
mixed. While some drinkers indicated potential reduction in intake, thus possibly 
reducing alcohol harms in the long-term, the expected, or even desired, from a public 
health perspective, effects on consumption and associated harms might not be fully 
realised in this group. To mitigate possible unintended short-term detrimental effects of 
MUP on the most vulnerable, careful planning and appropriate resourcing may be 
required prior to implementation.  
 
Keywords Alcohol policy, alcohol consumption, minimum unit pricing, heavy drinkers, 
Scotland 
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Introduction 
The personal, social and economic cost of alcohol consumption in Scotland has been 
estimated to be approximately £7.5bn  per year (Johnson, Ludbrook, & Jaffray, 2012) 
and whilst rates of associated health problems and mortality overall have been reducing 
in the past ten years, they continue to surpass those of the rest of the UK (Beeston, Reid, 
Robinson, Craig, McCartney, Graham et al., 2013) In 2014, 18 per cent more alcohol 
was sold per adult in Scotland compared with England and Wales (Robinson, Beeston, 
McCartney, & Craig, 2015).  
 
Scottish governmental responses have included a range of legislative measures through 
the ‘Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: A Framework for Action’ (Scottish 
Government, 2009), which adopts a whole population approach. In an attempt to 
mitigate the effects of low cost and easily accessible alcohol (acknowledged by the 
Health First evidence-based alcohol strategy (University of Stirling, 2013) to be two key 
drivers facilitating excessive alcohol consumption), the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 
2010 was implemented in October 2011 (Scottish Parliament, 2010). This legislation 
banned quantity discounts plus other alcohol promotions in off-sales premises (outlets 
licensed to sell alcohol for consumption off the premises). A subsequent reduction in 
off-trade wine sales was reported, but with little evidence of impact on sales of other 
drink types (Robinson, Geue, Lewsey, Mackay, McCartney, Curnock, et al., 2013). 
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However, Nakamura, Suhrcke, Pechey, Morciano, Roland, and Marteau (2013) found 
that banning alcohol multi-buy promotions (primarily for beer, cider and wine) in 
Scotland did not reduce alcohol purchasing in the short term, and suggested that wider 
regulation of price promotion and price would be required.   
 
The Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 (Scottish Parliament, 2012), will 
set a minimum price at which a unit of alcohol may be sold (one UK unit equals 
8gm/10ml ethanol), currently favoured at 50 pence (£0.5: US$0.8) per UK unit (50ppu). 
However, the legality of this Act in terms of international trade agreements was 
challenged by the trade bodies representing alcohol producers, and it was referred to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ ruled that the Act was in breach of EU free-
trade laws, but returned the case to Scotland civil courts for a final ruling. At the time of 
writing, this process is ongoing, and the outcome, and therefore any implementation 
date for the Act, remains uncertain. An account of the Act’s development and the policy 
context can be found in Katikireddi, Hilton, Bonell, and Bond (2014a) and Katikireddi, 
Bond, and Hilton (2014b). 
 
Evidence in support of increasing the price of alcohol in order to reduce alcohol-related 
morbidity and mortality derived from systematic reviews emerging from the UK, 
Australia, the United States and Europe, is persuasive (e.g. Booth, Meier, Stockwell, 
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Sutton Wilkinson, & Wong, 2008; Elder, Lawrence, Ferguson, Naimi, Brewer, 
Chattopadhyay et al., 2010; Jackson, Johnson, Campbell, Messina, Guillaume, Meier et 
al., 2010; Wagenaar, Tobler, & Komro, 2010).  Scottish Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) 
legislation was also critically informed by a model proposed by Sheffield University 
(Meng, Hill-McManus, Brennan, & Meier, 2010; Meng, Purshouse, Brennan, & Meier, 
2012; Purshouse, Meng, Rafia, Brennan, & Meier, 2009). The Sheffield Alcohol Policy 
Model version 2 was adapted to a Scottish context by incorporating Scotland-specific 
data on levels of alcohol consumption, the prices paid by population sub-groups for 
different categories of alcohol and the preferences for off-licensed trade versus on-
licensed trade purchasing (Purshouse et al., 2009).  
 
Updated versions of the model (Meng et al., 2012) adjusting for the imposition of a 
50ppu minimum price combined with a discount ban, predict figures for extra spending 
per annum for moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers at £11, £65 and £148 
respectively, which equates to an additional spend per week of £0.22, £1.25 and £2.83. 
The model defines moderate drinkers as men/women who consume no more than 21/14 
UK units per week, hazardous drinkers as consuming between 21/14 and 50/35 units per 
week and harmful drinkers as consuming more than 50/35 units per week respectively.  
 
In British Columbia, Canada, where alcohol minimum pricing (not minimum unit price) 
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has been introduced, significant health benefits have been observed, including a 32% 
reduction in wholly alcohol attributable deaths following a 10% increase in average 
minimum price for all alcoholic drinks (Zhao, Stockwell, Martin, Macdonald, Vallance, 
Treno et al., 2013). An important assertion is that, despite popular opinion, even the 
heaviest drinkers reduced their consumption when minimum alcohol prices increased 
(Zhao et al., 2013). 
 
The Scottish Government believes that MUP is the most effective of a range of policy 
options to tackle price, and help reduce alcohol consumption and related harm (Scottish 
Government website). MUP would set a floor price for one unit of alcohol, below which 
it could not be sold. For example, one 440 ml can of 5% cider contains 2.2 units, 
therefore the minimum price for which it could be legally sold would be £1.10, so there 
would be no financial benefit in buying in bulk (as is currently the case). Certainly 
current Scottish sales data (Robinson et al., 2015) would predict the greatest impact on 
the price of spirits (particularly vodka) and strong white cider. Those defined as 
moderate drinkers would be marginally affected as they consume a small amount of 
alcohol. Alcohol purchasing in licensed premises (e.g. pubs, restaurants) is likely to be 
unaffected by MUP as prices already greatly exceed the minimum proposed.  
The developers of the Sheffield Model acknowledge that as it is based on general 
population data, it cannot predict the impact on heavy drinkers. Byrnes, Shakeshaft, 
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Petrie, and Doran (2013), using Australian survey data, reported that when faced with 
price increases, ‘high intensity’ drinkers continued to binge by reducing their alcohol 
consumption between episodes of binging. The reduced drinking in itself may afford 
some health benefits, but the episodic binging represents a harmful drinking pattern. As 
the price of individual, cheap drinks will increase, a likely effect of MUP may be 
surmised from the findings of the following studies.  Recent work from New Zealand 
(Casswell, Huckle, Wall, & Yeh, 2014) revealed that heavy drinkers paid more for 
alcohol overall than the general population because they consumed more, but they paid 
less for individual drinks as they bought disproportionate quantities of cheap, typically 
strong, alcohol. They tended to buy their alcohol from off-trade sources. Similar 
conclusions were reached in two separate studies involving  drinkers harmed by their 
alcohol consumption in Scotland (Black, Gill, & Chick, 2011; Black, Michalova, Gill, 
Rees, Chick, O’May, et al., 2014), where participants tended to purchase cheap alcohol, 
with around 95% of purchases being from off-sale outlets (i.e. supermarkets and corner 
shops etc.). 
 
 A common criticism of increasing the price of alcohol is that, if people with alcohol 
dependence can no longer afford their drink of choice, they will need to find a 
substitute, whether that be cheaper alcohol, counterfeit or illicit alcohol, or other 
substances. Alternatively, they might resort to theft. On balance, the evidence suggests 
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that increases in alcohol pricing tend to be associated with reductions in crime (Home 
Office, 2011), but there is currently insufficient evidence to determine the impact of 
alcohol prices and purchase of other licit and illicit substances (Hunt, Rabinovich, & 
Baumberg, 2010). 
 
Thus it appears that further data relating to the drinking patterns of the heaviest drinkers 
in society would be valuable and informative. These drinkers rarely take part in routine 
population surveys documenting consumption (Livingston & Callinan, 2015), and 
factors, other than price, which restrict or facilitate their consumption, are poorly 
described.  As suggested by Chalmers (2014), the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model would 
ideally be built on a dataset including people's alcohol purchases, consumption, location of 
purchase, and price. 
 
Our participants comprised both dependent drinkers, and those whose health was at 
least harmed in some way by their drinking, as they were all recruited in hospital or 
clinic settings for treatment relating to their alcohol consumption. To our knowledge, 
this is the first report exploring the current, and self-predictions of future, purchasing 
behaviour of a group of heavy (as we refer to them throughout the paper) drinkers 
explicitly in relation to proposed alcohol policy. 
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Aims and Objectives 
In light of the recent policy measures proposed by the Scottish Government, this study 
interviewed heavy drinkers in order to elicit their views regarding the cost of alcohol in 
Scotland, explore their awareness of increases in alcohol price, and opinions regarding 
implications of MUP should it be implemented, at a personal and wider level.  
 
Methods 
The findings reported here are in accordance with the COREQ 32-item checklist (Tong, 
Sainsbury, & Craig, 2007). This study sits within a two year prospective study of 639 
patients attending alcohol treatment services as outpatients or admitted as hospital 
inpatients with an alcohol-related problem (which has resulted in physiological and/or 
psychosocial harm), who were interviewed about their drinking and purchasing habits 
approximately every six months over a period of 24-30 months.  
 
Participants were asked at their third quantitative interview (T3), (between October 
2013 and March 2014, around 18 months after recruitment), whether they would be 
willing to take part in an additional semi-structured face-to-face interview (see 
Appendix 1) to explore their experiences and views about recent alcohol policy and the 
governmental proposal to legislate a ‘minimum unit price’ for alcohol. The interview 
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was scheduled for a date as soon after the T3 interview as mutually convenient, mostly 
between one and four weeks. From those who indicated willingness, 20 participants 
were recruited, ten from each of the two Scottish cities in the study (Glasgow and 
Edinburgh). Participants were purposively selected on the basis that they had been 
drinking at hazardous or harmful levels at T3, and that the average price they were 
paying at that time was less than 50ppu. Care was taken to ensure that they were 
approximately representative of the total sample by gender, social deprivation quintile 
and age (see Table 1). Participants were contacted by telephone, and interview dates and 
times arranged. If participants failed to keep their appointment, they were contacted to 
confirm whether or not they were still willing to take part, if not, the interviewer then 
selected another potential participant from those meeting the inclusion criteria, until the 
target quota of 10 participants from each city was achieved.  
 
Of the 28 participants contacted, three failed to respond, two declined to participate, and 
three did not attend the arranged interview. Of the 20 interviewed, five were not 
drinking at the time of the qualitative interview, but reported harmful drinking at some 
stage in the six month period prior to, or at, T3; mean age was 48.3 years, five were 
female. Reported median weekly consumption (past seven days, or typical drinking 
week) was 130.7 units at T3 (range 28 to 256.26 units), and all social quintiles were 
represented, broadly mirroring the distribution in the larger study.  
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Prior to the interview, participants received by mail details of the interview topics, 
assurance of anonymity and confidentiality, and their right to discontinue the interview 
at any point, with no detrimental consequences. It was emphasised that the questions 
were designed to obtain their views and opinions, and that there were no right or wrong 
answers. Interviews took place in a health service site. Consent for being interviewed 
and for audio recording was taken at interview. During each interview, the interviewer 
gave a brief explanation of the Alcohol Minimum Pricing Act, followed by an example, 
using white cider, and their preferred drink (if that was different), to demonstrate how 
the existing price would be affected by a MUP of 50ppu. 
 
Interviews were arranged and conducted by the researchers who had administered the 
earlier quantitative interviews (HB, CR), to capitalise on the degree of trust already 
established. Interviews were recorded using an encrypted digital recorder, and were 
between 20 and 50 minutes in length. An additional member of the research team 
(FO’M) was also in attendance (once the participant had given permission) to observe 
the interview and make notes, subsequently transcribe the recordings, and analyse the 
data. Interviews were conducted between October 2013 and March 2014, between one 
and six weeks after T3 interview. Handwritten fieldwork notes were kept during the 
data collection and analysis process. Upon completion of the interview, participants 
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were given a £10 voucher for a high street pharmacy-led health and beauty store, and 
reimbursed for any travel expenses. 
 
Data analysis 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim by the first author, and during this process 
initial thoughts and ideas were noted down, as an essential part of the analytic process 
(Riessman, 1993).  Thematic analysis was conducted, as described by Braun and Clarke 
(2006). All the transcripts were read multiple times, to identify categories of relevance 
to the research aims; emerging themes and commonalities were noted. These categories 
were then grouped according to consistency in topic, as well as in relation to the 
research aims, and themes were thereby constructed, representing recurring topics. 
Verification of coding was confirmed by a second research team member and all 
authors had iterative discussions regarding the construction of themes and their 
interpretation. The constant comparative method was used to help identify reasons for 
patterns and contradictions in the data. 
 
Ethical approval was provided by NHS Lothian Research Ethics Committee and was 
reviewed by the respective Caldicott Guardians. 
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Results 
When asked about proposed alcohol policy, specifically MUP, participants gave wide 
ranging responses, sometimes relating it to their own personal experiences, and at other 
times projecting, referring to other drinkers, known or unknown to them, or the general 
public.  
 
Contextually, public houses and bars played a minimal role in participants’ lives, with 
only one or two reporting drinking in pubs, and then only occasionally, or when friends 
took them out. Pubs were generally considered to be far too expensive for alcoholic and 
non-alcoholic drinks alike, the latter reducing any incentive to supplement or replace 
alcoholic beverages, and actually encouraging individuals to drink at home. Other 
comments indicated that pubs were where social drinking took place, which was no 
longer possible for these individuals; that they were not safe places because people 
could become violent and aggressive; and that drinking soft drinks in a pub made you 
feel silly as pubs were for drinking alcohol.  
 
Drinkers’ anticipated personal strategies to cope with an increase in drink prices 
through MUP implementation 
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When asked what would happen if the price of their preferred drinks were to increase, 
various tactical ways to manage were proffered. One participant reported she would 
switch from lager to spirits, as they were higher strength and she would get more units 
for her money, and could make her drink last longer by adding mixers. Alternatively 
switching to cheaper alcohol, such as white cider or supermarket own brand, was 
mentioned, “… it’s only when I’m down to my last pennies, and what can I buy for this, 
and my option is, I can get cheap cider for it” [P4, female], and “I would probably 
change what I was drinking … cider, or something cheap and nasty” … [brand of white 
cider] [P18, male]; or reducing consumption, in some cases dramatically, ““Phhhh… 
there’s no way I could address it … I would actually just need to cut right back or stop” 
[P5, male] and “… I would really struggle to actually maintain the drinking level … I 
would have to dramatically reduce my alcohol intake … well, I’d have to try [P15, 
male]. 
 
Some would be prepared to cut back on drink, in order to keep food intake constant, “I 
have to buy all the food, I haven’t got any choice, it’s the drinking that has to be cut 
back on” [P9, male], whereas others would cut back on food, “I’d still be able to buy it 
[alcohol], I’d just do without food” [P16, female], or not pay bills, borrow money and 
get into debt or increase debt in order to maintain alcohol consumption, “I’d probably 
borrow money off my family members, especially my oldest daughter … that would be 
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my only way round about it” [P13, female], and “… I would just do without heating and 
I’d have to rely on my family more … or friends [P17, male]. 
 
Others tactics included shopping elsewhere and seeking out offers. One candidly stated 
he did not know how he would procure his alcohol, but “I think it will be drastic, what I 
would go to, to get what I need” [P1, male]. 
 
Those respondents who were either not drinking at the time of interview, or had cut 
down, spoke of ‘others’, saying perhaps ‘they’ might resort to stealing alcohol, or 
switch drink type, 
 “… if they’re that advanced … they’ll go and get something else. I don’t know 
what I think about it, but I don’t think it would stop. People will just go onto 
something cheaper and nastier, if they really wanted” [P3, male]. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the three participants who stated that they were not short of money were 
less concerned about any potential impact of MUP, “… it would be a while before I did 
that [change brands], because I’ve got enough money to pay for it”. [P2, male]; “… we 
have a bottle of wine amongst 3, every day. … Pinot noir, it’s good quality wine. So 
we’re not buying the £2 or £3 bottle of wine. Money is not the issue with us” [P8, male]; 
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and “that doesn’t bother me at all, the price of alcohol. I was buying it anyway. Eh, I 
don’t look at price” [P14, male]. 
 
Some participants perceived adverse health consequences of stopping or suddenly 
reducing alcohol intake in response to increased prices, in particular a fear of seizures 
by those who had themselves experienced them, as tolerance/dependence can vary 
widely, making seizure prediction difficult, “…[it] could harm people, especially if 
you’re a right alcoholic, it could destroy them, it could kill them – just totally cutting 
down” [P16, female].  
 
One participant, who had already reduced her alcohol consumption by approximately 
two thirds owing to financial constraints following a bereavement, said she would have 
to try to cut down further if prices continued to rise, but this caused her concern: 
“If it was to go up quite suddenly, I think my intake would be reduced again, 
because of the cost. … which really worries me, because at the moment, I’m 
comfortable in my own wee zone, because I’ve turned into a recluse, kind of, 
since my [bereavements]… it’s going to send me into a state of depression I 
think, because I’m out of my comfort zone”. [P6, female]. 
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A number of participants stated that if MUP was introduced, they would just have to 
stop drinking, but could not expand on how they might do that, other than one who said 
she would seek medical treatment, “I would just get myself in somewhere, like here 
[detox centre] … there would be no way around it for me, I would just have to ride it 
out, or get help”. [P4, female]. 
 
Awareness of MUP and perceptions of its potential wider impact.  
All participants had been informed about the proposed introduction of a minimum unit 
of pricing (MUP) at first, and subsequent, interviews. Some were aware that the 
legislation was currently being challenged, however, several claimed ignorance or did 
not know any details. Many expressed resistance to MUP, both from a personal 
perspective, as well as on behalf of others. One view was that people already paid 
enough tax, and claims that drinkers and smokers were ‘clogging up the health service’ 
should be counteracted by saying that the government gained a lot in tax from them, and 
that MUP ultimately would hurt people ‘at the bottom’. Another said, 
“I don’t believe MUP will work … to me, it’s one step away from prohibition. 
Alcohol is still going to be available, and it’s just going to be a lot more 
expensive, and all that will happen is that people that can afford it anyway, 
they’ll pay it … whether or not they’ve got an alcohol problem, and people that 
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can’t afford it, and who do have an alcohol problem …it’s going to lead to a 
burgeoning of a black market, which already exists with vodka, and whisky”. 
[P5, male]. 
 
A participant said that while he agreed with MUP in principle, because he was drinking 
heavily again, he would not welcome it in practice,  
“My opinion is, if they [drink prices] can put someone like me into this state, 
and they can achieve it so easily, then it’s a disgrace. … I would agree with that 
[MUP], unfortunately at the moment I wouldn’t”. [P1, male]. 
 
Another felt that “… if it’s [MUP] going to help people and alcoholics, good, but if it’s 
not going to make any difference, I don’t see why they don’t just leave it alone” [P7, 
male]. 
 
With regard to white cider specifically, there was a suggestion that MUP could be 
beneficial: 
“… I reckon if they kept 50 pence a unit, I think that would be better, because a 
lot of people would stop drinking [brand of white] cider, because I think that’s a 
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big, big problem. .. But £4 for 22 units – that’s how much a bottle of [brand] is 
… so if they put it at 50 pence a unit, I think that would work out better”. [P12, 
male]. 
 
It was also suggested that some people might even be persuaded to change from white 
cider to a ‘nicer drink’ or ‘trade up’ when they compared the prices post MUP. One 
respondent calculated that his current three litre bottle of white cider would virtually 
triple in price at 50ppu, which he would no longer be able to afford,  
“A bottle of [brand of white cider] is going to be almost £10, that’s 3 litres. 
Currently I could get that or, the cheapest is £3.79, I think, so you’re looking at 
almost tripling the price. And there’s just no way I could afford that”. [P5, 
male]. 
 
A participant who was currently not drinking thought that the effect of MUP on cheap 
ciders would “probably be a good thing” but went on to say that in his opinion,  
“if somebody wants to drink, they’ll drink. They won’t be happy about the extra 
price, but if they’re an alcoholic or whatever, they will find a way to pay the 
money…” [P7, male] 
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One participant, for whom money was not an issue, was positive regarding the 
proposition of MUP and felt that 50ppu was too cheap, “I would think it should be 60-
65 pence. That’s my view” [P8, male]. Another, similarly without financial problems, 
thought MUP would serve as a wakeup call, and that any disincentive would be 
positive,  
“I suppose it would make me realise just how much money I was wasting on it, 
when I could use the money for other things. It would be a big [sigh] reason to 
drink less, or stop drinking. It might not be enough to completely stop me, but it 
would be a very big consideration“ [P2, male].  
Several respondents indicated that they did not feel they would be personally affected, 
as they were already paying more than 50ppu. A retailer’s point of view was provided 
by a participant whose employment had involved the sale of alcohol. He was receptive 
to the prospect of MUP, as a means of removing the financial advantage perceived to be 
currently enjoyed by bulk-buying supermarkets: 
“… if I was still in business, I would have loved minimum pricing to come in, if I 
was selling alcohol … levelled the playing field. They couldn’t sell stuff cheaper 
than a certain amount, and I could probably sell for that price as well”. [P14, 
male]. 
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One participant suggested that MUP could reduce drinking by younger people, who 
tend to drink the cheapest drinks, particularly white cider and vodka, and that a dramatic 
price rise might make them think about spending their money on other items or 
activities: 
“… it is relatively cheap to go and get blasted for the weekend, you know, but 
for somebody to go to the cinema, it’s a tenner. … or to go swimming, they’d 
have the bus fare there, the bus fare back, that’s £1.40 … plus the price of £3.50 
to get into the swimming pool, that’s a fiver. You know, get somebody else to 
give us a pound, that’s two big bottles of cider! Way hay! … it’s too accessible, 
you know, and everything else is too expensive” [P20, female]. 
 
 However, she did not think that MUP would influence those who were addicted, as 
“they’ll obtain alcohol wherever and however” [P20], which included driving to 
England to obtain cheaper alcohol, buying illicit alcohol, and home brewing. Others 
similarly predicted the likely failure of MUP,  
“I don’t think there’s anything else the politicians can do. If they introduce 
minimum pricing, then, they’ll just, they’ll still drink the alcohol, em, or they’ll 
be … pooling their money to get the stronger stuff, if that’s what they want … 
they’ll still get the alcohol … regardless of the price”. [P14, male]. 
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None of our participants indicated that they would resort to drinking illicit alcohol, 
following the proposed introduction of MUP; indeed some stated they were very fearful 
of the damage such drink could potentially inflict and would not touch it, “It might not 
be ethanol, it might be methanol that’s in it, and you wake up blind or something. I just 
wouldn’t touch that.” [P5, male]. Only one participant mentioned potentially switching 
from alcohol to drugs, saying he would “just buy a bit of dope!” [P3, male]. 
 
Discussion  
MUP is a whole population intervention, and the participants in our study are members 
of a small but noteworthy section of the population, many of whom would be 
disproportionately affected by an increase in alcohol prices, such as through MUP, 
owing to the large volume and cheaper type of alcohol they purchased. Our findings 
show a range of views and awareness regarding MUP, and a varied perception of its 
hypothesised impact consistent with the demographic spread across Scottish Index of 
Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) quintiles, age, and levels of consumption. Participants 
who were already abstaining, and those who were considering abstention or reducing 
their consumption to ‘safe’ levels, were more receptive to MUP than those who were 
not. Two participants reported that they would have to reduce their alcohol purchasing 
and consumption if MUP was introduced, owing to financial constraints, thus 
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supporting the purpose of MUP.  
 
Several respondents struggled to understand the concept of MUP; they still talked of 
trading down, using white cider as a fall back, or making more of an effort to track 
down special offers (which would no longer exist). They had not understood that they 
would be paying a minimum of 50 pence for each unit of alcohol (8g ethanol) contained 
in a drink, with no option to benefit financially from e.g. bulk buying or purchasing an 
alternative beverage type. Our quantitative data show that the mean unit price paid for 
beer was slightly above 50ppu (Gill, Chick, Black, Rees, O'May, Rush, et al., 2015), 
but, we propose, high alcohol consumption levels of beer drinkers are supported 
through the availability of cheaper drinks like cider (Black et al.,  2014).  
 
It is important that discussion of the potential impact of MUP does not disregard the 
addictive nature of alcohol and its impact on purchasing. Many participants were 
generally not able to plan ahead, let alone take account of legislation that might not be 
implemented for years, if at all. To them MUP was a vague and obscure concept, their 
attitude was that they would deal with any issues if, and when, it was in place. This 
absence of personal anticipatory preparation for MUP implementation could have 
implications for health services, such as increased emergency hospital admissions and 
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demands on detox services. 
 
Reducing alcohol harm is a complex problem, requiring complex solutions. From their 
global systematic review and narrative synthesis of 42 studies which focused on alcohol 
policy interventions, Diepeveen, Ling, Suhrcke, Roland and Marteau (2013) concluded 
that public acceptability of government interventions to change behaviour is greatest for 
the least intrusive interventions, which are often the least effective, and for interventions 
targeting the behaviour of others, rather than the respondents themselves. They 
recommend further research to assess how the presentation of the problem and the 
benefits of the intervention might increase acceptability for those interventions which 
are more effective but less acceptable. Results from recent Scottish and English research 
(APISE study) showed that harmful and hazardous drinkers were less likely to support 
alcohol policies than moderate drinkers, but that the majority of respondents believed 
that the government has a responsibility and should be doing more to tackle harms 
caused by alcohol. Opinion on how they should be doing this, and who they should be 
targeting, however, was not clear (Li, 2014).  
 
Lonsdale, Hardcastle, and Hagger (2012) reported scepticism regarding effectiveness of 
minimum unit pricing as a means to reduce alcohol consumption from a sample of 218 
members of different community groups in England, of whom 10 were hazardous 
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drinkers, but none was a  dependent drinker. In our study, many  participants did not 
feel that any proposed alcohol policy was going to help them, but that the introduction 
of, for example, MUP, might reduce the likelihood of younger people developing the 
same drinking patterns and harms that they had.  
 
Instead of perpetuating the perception that alcohol misuse is largely an individual 
problem best avoided and managed through education, counselling, and medical 
treatment, Groves (2010), amongst others, has suggested that for the UK, the health and 
societal costs of alcohol misuse are best prevented through legislation on pricing and 
marketing. In this vein, portraying alcohol policy as a broad, multi-sectoral, public 
health issue that requires a whole-population approach has been crucial to policy 
development in Scotland (Katikireddi et al., 2014b). However, certain individuals 
and/or groups of people, such as those with alcohol related harm interviewed in this 
study, may be affected more than others, perhaps by some unintended consequences. If 
MUP were introduced, the population effect (Meng et al., 2012) might be delayed. The 
lower-risk drinkers in Scotland could either over time reduce their consumption, decide 
to pay a bit more to maintain it, or even stockpile some cheaper pre-MUP alcohol. 
However, for the people we interviewed, who have a high frequency of purchasing and 
high expenditure owing to the high volumes purchased, the impact of MUP would be 
immediate, particularly so for white cider and cheap vodka drinkers. 
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Certainly, evidence shows that increasing the price of alcohol reduces harms of various 
types, and indicates that dependent drinkers are no exception to the rule that alcohol 
consumers respond to changes in alcohol prices (Babor, Caetano, Casswell, Edwards, 
Giesbrecht, Graham et al., 2010). Whilst a reduction in hospital admissions over time 
would be one anticipated effect of MUP, in the shorter term, the impact may be an 
increase and, if imposed during the winter months, an exacerbation of the general 
season-associated increase due to respiratory conditions and influenza (Scottish 
Government, 2015). The timing of its introduction should be carefully considered, in 
addition to the potential impact on quality of life, as many of our participants mentioned 
the competing financial demands of purchasing alcohol, buying food and paying 
household bills.  
 
Consequential changes in demands on treatment facilities also merit consideration. A 
recent survey of specialist alcohol treatment services in Scotland identified ongoing 
issues relating to service gaps, service planning, staffing, demand and missed 
appointments (cited in Beeston,  Geddes, Craig, Gordon, Graham, McAuley et al., 2014, 
p.16). Stockwell, Williams, and Pauly (2012) found that in British Columbia, when 
heavy drinkers were asked what they did if money was short, many said they applied for 
treatment. Sudden alcohol withdrawal is dangerous for dependent drinkers, in the most 
serious cases causing seizures. At the last estimate for Scotland only one in four alcohol 
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dependent drinkers was accessing alcohol services (Beeston et al., 2014), and Wallhed-
Finn, Bakshi and Andreasson (2014) reported that a minority of those with alcohol 
dependence seek and undergo treatment. All participants in our study have received 
treatment relating to their drinking at least once (their recruitment site), but there are 
likely many more (whose numbers we do not know) who have not engaged with 
services, or received support. If MUP is introduced, trading down to cheaper alcohol 
will no longer be an option, impacting on those already using services, but also 
potentially on an unknown number of people with alcohol dependence who are not. 
Any unintended increases in the numbers contacting health and/or social care would 
likely be short-term, following the implementation of a minimum unit price, and could 
well be counterbalanced by falls in service use over a longer time period, due to reduced 
consumption within a much larger section of the population. Within the heavy drinking 
population, arguably there might be a greater demand for treatment services (e.g. detox, 
counselling etc.) but a subsequent fall in emergency admissions due to accidents, 
bleeds, or myocardial infarction, for example, because of medically significant 
reductions in consumption. 
 
MUP is not a tax and any increased revenue from an increased unit in price is proposed 
to be returned to the retailer, who will also be at liberty to increase the price of any 
drink, not just those which are currently sold under the 50ppu (Sheffield Alcohol 
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Research Group website). One potential measure would be to annex part of the retailers’ 
anticipated profits and ring-fence for treatment services, in the form of a hypothecated 
tax, which would likely prove to be highly controversial (see e.g. Keable-Elliott 2014). 
 
One criticism of MUP is the potential for an increase in sales of illicit alcohol (Hilton, 
Wood, Patterson, & Katikireddi, 2014; Katikireddi et al., 2014b). Several participants 
referred to its availability, whilst many stated they would actively avoid illicit alcohol 
due to safety concerns. Whether they would reconsider this view when finances are 
extremely stretched is not known; with a choice between more expensive (legal) drinks 
and much cheaper (illegal) alcohol of unknown provenance and potential safety hazards. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
Our study has a number of strengths. To our knowledge, this is the first published study 
which explores the perceptions and behaviours of heavy drinkers with regard to  alcohol 
policy in Scotland, both extant and proposed, and provides insight into how members of 
a certain minority group felt they might be impacted by a population-level policy. 
Opinions and attitudes do not, of course, necessarily predict behaviour, and are likely 
coloured by current drinking status. Data were collected at an interesting time in the 
policy debate and complement existing research which has thus far primarily focused on 
30 
 
stakeholders’ perspectives, such as those in the public and voluntary sector, as well as 
industry representatives (Carrell, 2014; Katidireddi et al., 2014a, 2014b; Meng et al., 
2012; Scottish Government, 2012). 
 
A key limitation was the attrition rate of the study, which meant that at time of 
interview, the number of potential recruits available to sample had reduced from 639 to 
165. Additionally, as more than 100 of the attritions were attributed to death, we may 
not have been able to recruit those who were drinking the most (although we have 
presented their consumption figures at baseline, see Table 1). Certainly, evidence shows 
that increasing the price of alcohol reduces harms of various types, and indicates that 
dependent drinkers are no exception to the rule that alcohol consumers respond to 
changes in alcohol prices (Babor, Caetano, Casswell, Edwards, Giesbrecht, Graham et 
al., 2010). Whilst a reduction in hospital admissions over time would be one anticipated 
effect of MUP, in the shorter term, the impact may be an increase, and, if imposed 
during the winter months, an exacerbation of the general season-associated increase due 
to respiratory and influenza (Scottish Government, 2015). The timing of its introduction 
should be carefully considered. Some participants were not drinking at the time of the 
interview, and so they were describing actions in the past, or hypothesising with regard 
to how they might purchase alcohol, now, or in the future, so we have no way of 
knowing whether or how their purchasing habits would be affected. However, on 
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average, from our data, each participant would be required to increase expenditure by 
21% to obtain the equivalent number of units should MUP at 50ppu be introduced. Put 
another way, the potential reduction in unit consumption induced by MUP if 
participants did, or could, not increase their expenditure, would be 24% (total sample), 
but for the sub-group drinking exclusively white cider, their consumption would need to 
drop by 66% (Gill, et al., 2015). 
 
Conclusions 
Our findings provide important and relevant insights into the views and drinking 
practices of the heaviest consumers of alcohol. MUP has the potential to reduce alcohol 
related harms on multiple levels, impacting on drinkers across the spectrum. The unique 
pattern of drinking described by this group underscores the need for a more accurate 
modelling, such as with the Sheffield Model, of the potential ramifications of MUP. 
There are challenges associated with securing relevant informing data and population 
surveys have significant shortcomings in this regard. MUP is likely to impact positively 
on a large proportion of drinkers, including some heavy drinkers, but it may have some 
short-term implications for a small group of dependent drinkers, some of whom may be 
unable to cut down on their alcohol consumption, and others who would need to 
suddenly cut down drastically. Both of these scenarios may have unintended detrimental 
consequences, which should be planned for and resourced appropriately. From our 
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small study, we suggest that preventive and anticipatory approaches, targeted at those 
whose consumption causes them harm, could go a long way to making life better for all 
those who suffer from alcohol related harm. In addition, further qualitative investigation 
regarding barriers and facilitators to reducing alcohol consumption among heavy 
drinkers, in response to increased alcohol prices, would be welcome. 
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Appendix 1: Interview topics 
 
Changes to purchasing 
Have there been any changes with respect to the shops/supermarkets where you usually 
buy alcohol?  (relating to ban on discount buying, and placement of alcoholic drinks – 
Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act, 2010).  
Has this changed the amount you drink? If so, in what way?  
Do you think other drinkers have been affected by this change in the law?   
Own experiences buying alcoholic drinks.   
Have you noticed any other changes in the prices of drinks you normally buy/bought 
over the past 6 months? More/less expensive? 
During the previous 6 months have you ever changed brand/type of drink? If so, why? 
If not, why not? 
Do you seek out special offers?  Has this led to any change(s) in your drinking?  
 
Strategies used to continue to buy alcohol 
How have you managed to keep buying the amount of alcohol you have bought over the 
past 6 months? 
 
Drink pricing in Scotland 
What are your views regarding the price of drinks in Scotland? (on/off sales);  
What do you think the impact of a minimum unit price for alcoholic drinks will be for 
you; for others? 
If this legislation does come into effect, do you think you will personally be affected by 
it?  If yes, in what way?  If not, why not?  
Do you think this law would bring benefits? If so, for whom? Why? 
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Table 1: Participant demographics and consumption details at baseline and at time-point preceding qualitative interviews (n/a 
= not available for quantitative drinks interview, T3.) 
 
Participan
t no 
Cigarett
es 
smoked 
per day 
City  
Age 
(years) 
Sex 
SIMD 
Quintile 
Recorded drinking at Baseline 
Recorded drinking closest to timing of 
qualitative interview 
Index week 
Consumption 
(UK units) 
Drink 
Unit 
price 
(£) 
Index Week 
expenditure 
(£) 
Index week 
Consumption 
(UK units) 
Drink 
Unit 
price (£) 
Index Week 
expenditure 
(£) 
P1 25 G 42 M  1 351.00 0.46 155.4 175.44 0.49 86.30 
P2 5 G 57 M 5 79.44 0.53 42.46 28.00 0.54 14.99 
P3 25 G 36 M 4 131.25 0.48 63.00 n/a n/a n/a 
P4 5 G 39 F 3 136.50 0.62 84.00 196.88 0.48 94.50 
P5 25 G 46 M 1 525.00 0.43 224.00 123.75 0.15 18.89 
P11 7 G 54 M 3 472.50 0.16 73.50 236.10 0.19 45.66 
P12 10 G 37 M 1 184.80 0.45 84.00 140.00 0.50 70.00 
P13 0 G 60 F 1 94.16 0.48 31.84 147.00 0.45 65.66 
P14 13 G 54 M 4 84.00 0.64 54.00 n/a n/a n/a 
P15 30 G 39 M 3 406.10 0.29 119.20 256.26 0.30 77.06 
P6 20 E 50 F 4 91.91 0.44 40.60 91.91 0.50 45.50 
P7 7 E 49 M 2 222.60 0.22 49.84 159.04 0.44 70.00 
P8 0 E 67 M 5 151.81 0.59 89.60 29.06 0.55 15.92 
P9 70 E 64 M 5 175.70 0.52 92.20 172.50 0.18 30.97 
P10 10 E 57 M 1 112.50 0.48 54.50 45.00 0.45 23.60 
P16 40 E 39 F 1 254.53 0.25 56.40 103.54 0.31 32.07 
P17 0 E 41 M 1 153.92 0.49 75.80 137.70 0.46 60.00 
P18 20 E 34 M 1 219.00 0.49 107.00 62.13 0.45 27.95 
P19 2 E 55 M 2 226.71 0.63 142.10 160.16 0.33 53.24 
P20 8 E 46 F 4 73.15 0.82 60.00 117.04 0.60 70.00 
 
 
